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SECTARIANISM FROM THE TOP







n September 14, 2019, pre-dawn
strikes against two major Saudi oil
facilities knocked out half the output
of the world’s largest oil exporter and
raised the real prospect of direct armed
confrontation between Saudi Arabia and its
perennial rival Iran, which it blamed for the
attacks (Hubbard, Karasz, and Reed 2019). The
incident was the culmination of a decade of open
hostility, mutual recriminations, and, in Syria
and Yemen, effective proxy warfare. The episode
is also, however, a stark illustration of an ongoing
puzzle in the politics of the Persian Gulf and
wider Middle East and North Africa: unlike at
other points since the beginning of the Arab
uprisings in 2011, the latest dramatic escalation
in tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran has
not been accompanied by a spike in sectarianism
—or the conflation of the countries’ geopolitical
competition with their respective sponsorship of
Sunni and Shi‘i Islam. More generally, sectarian
rhetoric at the elite and popular levels has notably
dissipated across the region, with political
conflicts much more likely to be described and
analyzed in dry bureaucratic terms than
attributed to primordial divisions. If sectarianism
represents the politicization of confessional group
identity, then why has the increasing possibility
of war between the Middle East’s two political-
cum-religious powers coincided with a years-long
decrease rather than increase in sectarian conflict,
incitement, and overall narrative?
The present essay explores this incongruence
as a way of better understanding the nature and
drivers of sectarianism and de-sectarianization in
the MENA region. It makes two key arguments,
supported by public opinion and other data that
substantiate the marked decline in Arabs’ concern
over sectarianism since 2011. It argues, first, that
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
the review of faith & international affairs | 109
Abstract: Sectarian politics has retreated across the Middle East in
the years after the Arab Spring, even as conflict between the region’s
two main sectarian actors—Iran and Saudi Arabia—has
intensified. This essay explores this incongruence as a way of better
understanding the nature and drivers of sectarianism and de-
sectarianization in MENA states, supported by public opinion and
other data that substantiate the post-2011 decline in Arabs’
concern over sectarianism. It contends that the close
correspondence between the rise and demise of the Arab Spring on
the one hand, and that of sectarianism on the other, supports an
instrumentalist interpretation of sectarian politics in the region.
Keywords: Sectarianism, de-sectarianization, Arab Spring, Middle
East, public opinion
the loss of salience of sectarian division suggests
that the processes of sectarianization are much
more closely linked to local contests for power
between political groupings and the state, as
opposed to larger inter-state rivalry between
country actors often ascribed a sectarian agenda.
Second, it contends that the close correspondence
between the rise and demise of the Arab Spring
on the one hand, and that of sectarianism on the
other, is evidence supporting an instrumentalist
interpretation of sectarian politics in the Gulf and
greater Middle East.
The Rise and Decline of Middle East
Sectarianism after 2011
Public interest in and worry over the spread of
sectarian conflict in MENA countries, and in the
Gulf region in particular, has fallen off drastically
since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011. That
year saw the spread of Arab demonstrations from
confessionally-homogenous North Africa to a
number of more religiously diverse societies:
Yemen in January,1 Bahrain in February, and
Saudi Arabia and Syria in March. Suddenly, the
Arab Spring had the impression not of a
movement for change and democracy, but of a
transnational settling of sectarian grievances. This
conclusion was helped along by embattled Arab
rulers, who delegitimized opponents as stooges of
co-sectarian sponsors abroad. King Hamad of
Bahrain, for instance, penned aWashington Times
editorial justifying his government’s deadly
crackdown on Shi‘a-led protests by claiming they
“were hijacked by extremist elements with ties to
foreign governments in the region”—that is to
say, Iran (Al Khalifa 2011).
Some indication of the power and ubiquity of
the sectarian narrative at this time can be gleaned
from the output of scholars. In 2013–2014 alone,
there would appear three volumes on Middle East
sectarianism (Matthiesen 2013; Potter 2014;
Wehrey 2013), to be soon followed by several
more (Hashemi and Postel 2017; Wehrey 2017).
The spike in interest was not limited to academia,
however. The idea of regional Sunni-Shi‘i
conflict, promoted by state-controlled satellite
networks and amplified by emerging social media
(Siegel 2015), resonated with Arab publics.
Figure 1 shows online Arabic search interest in
“sectarianism” (“ ةيفئاطلا ”) over the period from
2011 to 2019 (Google Trends, generated on
October 23, 2019). The line shows the level of
search interest relative to the highest point during
the period, which is set at 100. The chart
demonstrates that peak popularity occurred as
expected during the opening months of 2011,
spiking intermittently through 2015 but never
again reaching even half of 2011 levels.
By the time of the suspected Iranian attack on
Saudi oil infrastructure in September 2019,
public interest in sectarianism in the Arab world
amounted to a mere 6 percent of peak interest.
And this despite ongoing civil wars in Syria and
Yemen, the resumption of Iran’s nuclear program
following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015
nuclear accord, and other key developments that
might have contributed to the politicization of
sectarian identity.
Figure 1. Interest in Sectarianism ( ةيفئاطلا ) among Arab Publics, 2011–2019.
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Scientific polling data collected in the
MENA region tell the same story about the
declining salience of sectarianism. Figure 2
depicts reported concern over regional sectarian
division in a diverse set of eight Arab countries
included in the fourth and fifth waves of the
widely-used Arab Barometer survey, conducted
in 2016–2017 and 2018–2019, respectively
(Tessler et al. 2016).2 In every country surveyed,
the proportion of citizens who said they were
“very concerned” about “the spread of sectarian
division in the region” plummeted in the years
between the two surveys. Drops occurred
irrespective of the absolute level of concern. In
Tunisia, for instance, almost 8 in 10 citizens
reported being highly worried about
sectarianism in 2016–2017, but in 2018–2019
only 54 percent said the same. Algerians,
Moroccans, and Qataris expressed far less worry
in 2016–2017, yet their concern had waned
even further by 2018–2019. Overall, average
concern across the eight countries nearly halved
from 2016–2017 to 2018–2019, falling from 52
percent to 29 percent.
Drawing Lessons from the Middle
East’s Unlikely De-sectarianization
But how to account for this fizzling out of the
sectarian narrative while conflicts between Sunni
and Shi‘i actors, at both the state and inter-state
level, persist? The explanation lies in the parallel
trajectory of the Arab Spring, and points to the
deliberate divide-and-rule strategy of
authoritarian states as the key first mover in the
sectarian cascade. Beginning in earnest with the
Bahrain uprising of February 2011, Arab and
especially Arab Gulf rulers employed what
Brumberg has called “protection-racket politics”
(Brumberg 2013, 88–103) to dissuade members
of their mainly co-sectarian support bases from
joining the opposition, lest they enable their own
subjugation at the hands of their political-cum-
confessional rivals. In the absence of cross-societal
coordination that could exert effective pressure
for political change, mass demonstrations were
demonized locally and abroad as unrepresentative
and undemocratic, snuffed out militarily, and
then followed by a complete closing off of the
political space (Al-Rasheed 2011). In short, the
Figure 2. Concern over Regional Sectarian Division in Eight Arab Countries, 2016–2017 vs. 2018–2019.
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sectarian narrative ended in large part because it
was no longer needed by threatened regimes,
while on the other hand it carried significant risks
of blow-back (Gengler 2015).
Meanwhile, Gulf states’ preoccupation with
domestic unrest after 2011 was to be replaced by
direct involvement in external conflicts—first in
Yemen and then with each other following the
June 2017 blockade of Qatar led by Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (Ulrichsen 2020).
Emphasizing religious and other group cleavages is
a useful strategy to pre-empt political cooperation
among citizens, but for exactly that reason it is
unproductive as a means of rallying the population
behind a national cause. Hence the rise of state-
sponsored “militarized
hypernationalism” (Al-Rasheed
2015), in the terms of Al-
Rasheed, spearheaded by Saudi
Arabia’s newly-empowered
Deputy Crown Prince
Muhammad bin Salman. Saudi
Arabia and the other Gulf states
were also embarking on deep,
unpopular structural reforms of
the welfare state that required financial sacrifices of
all citizens, after the 2014 crash in oil prices
(Gengler and Lambert 2016). It was now the
strengthening of national rather than sectarian
identity that would help push forward the state’s
agenda, with Qatar-sympathizing traitors taking
over for Shi‘a fifth-columnists as the officially-
sanctioned objects of scorn (Nereim 2019).
Likewise on the side of ordinary citizens,
sectarian identity gains special relevance and is
more likely to serve as a basis for coalition-
building when uncertainty prevails about the
outcome of a political struggle over the
distribution of power and resources, such as in
the early days of the Arab Spring and, before that,
post-2003 Iraq. When no such ambiguity exists
because a political conflict is absent or already has
been decided, or because citizen mobilization is
impossible due to extreme repression, then
sectarian identity naturally loses an important,
potent part of its political raison d’être (but see
Brooke 2017).3 The processes that encourage and
privilege the activation of sectarian identity—
both at the individual psychological level and at
the elite strategic level—are thus closely
connected to feelings of insecurity and fear that
attend challenges to the socio-political status quo.
Such a reading suggests not only an
instrumentalist basis of sectarian politics in the
Middle East, clearly, but also a primarily top-down
rather than bottom-up instrumentalism. In the
Gulf case particularly, the close parallel between
changing state threat perceptions and the rise and
decline of sectarianism since 2011 serves as
empirical evidence of elite manipulation (Haddad
2011; Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008),4 rather than
popular sentiment and everyday reification (Fibiger
2018), as the original impetus down the course of
sectarianization. That is because, in the
authoritarian Middle East, it
is the state and political
leaders who are able to choose
their internal and external
political battles, and who
enjoy the instruments and
resources to frame for
ordinary people those
conflicts they do not begin of
their own accord. Arab rulers
are well equipped to dictate the nature and degree
of instability experienced by the population, and
the terms in which they understand it, whereas
except in uncommon revolutionary circumstances
the reverse is not true. Although this power
imbalance may be shifting with the spread of social
media and the decentralization of information,
citizens remain at a decided disadvantage in their
ability to create and control political narratives.
One need not simply take this author’s word for
it, however. For the first time in 2018–2019, the
Arab Barometer survey asked Arab men and women
directly whether they believed that regional sectarian
tensions are due to “a religious divide between Shi‘a
and Sunna” or instead “a political divide between
politicians.” Twice as many citizens identified
political contestation (49 percent) as compared to
doctrinal differences (25 percent) as the main cause
of sectarian division, while a fifth of respondents
blamed both factors. This raises the possibility of a
final, more hopeful contributor to the notable
decline in Middle East sectarianism over the past
decade: that most citizens have finally wised up to
the destructive and self-defeating political game. v
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Notes
1. Although the Yemen uprising was not generally viewed through a sectarian lens in 2011, it set the stage for the takeover of the state
by Zaydi rebels in 2014 and subsequent military intervention by Saudi Arabia.
2. It is telling that the Arab Barometer, which has conducted 50 surveys in 15 different Arab countries since 2006, did not ask a
question about sectarianism until after its third wave that began in 2012.
3. Not to say its reality or relevance for individuals’ lived experiences.
4. Cf. the literature on “sectarian entrepreneurs.”
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